The Ridicule of Time: Science Fiction, Bioethics, and the Posthuman by Jay Clayton
The Ridicule of Time: Science Fiction, Bioethics, and the Posthuman
Jay Clayton
American Literary History, Volume 25, Number 2, Summer 2013, pp.
317-340 (Article)
Published by Oxford University Press
For additional information about this article
                                              Access provided by Vanderbilt University Library (6 Jun 2013 09:56 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/alh/summary/v025/25.2.clayton.html




Suppose you were a science fiction fan, a Trekkie, and a
transhumanist; you once paid to attend a seminar with Raël, knew
all about Extropy back in the day, and subscribed to Longevity
Meme Newsletter; you have read articles about an “immortality
gene” and were thrilled to see Science publish a genome-wide
association study in 2010 identifying 150 genes that might
improve your chances of living to 100; and you practice extreme
caloric restriction while spending a fortune on dietary supple-
ments. Over the years, you have zealously collected the following
quotes but have forgotten the sources. Which of them do you think
came from classic 1950s works of science fiction and which from
publications by distinguished scientists, doctors, philosophers, and
law professors?
1. We, or our descendents, will cease to be human in the sense
in which we now understand that idea. (3)
2. By the standards of evolution, it will be cataclysmic—
instantaneous. It has already begun. (181)
3. The new immortals, in the decisive sense, would not be like
us at all. (265)
4. Man will go into history along with the Java ape man, the
Neanderthal beast man, and the Cro-Magnon Primitive.
(187)
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5. Unlike the saber-toothed tiger . . . Homo sapiens would
spawn its own successors by fast-forwarding evolution. (17)
6. With the great lizards, with the sabertooth tiger, and the
bison, [humanity’s] day is done.1 (43)
7. We will see them as a threat to us, and thus seek to imprison
or simply kill them before they kill us. (286)
8. We evolved. We’re the next step up. (170)
The odd-numbered quotations are by prominent academics:
(1) John Harris, Alliance Professor of Bioethics at the University
of Manchester’s law school; (3) Leon R. Kass, Harding Professor
of Social Thought at the University of Chicago; (5) Gregory
Stock, former director of the Program on Medicine, Technology
and Society at UCLA’s medical school; and (7) George Annas,
Warren Distinguished Professor at Boston University. The even-
numbered quotations are by some of the most revered figures in
SF: (2) Arthur C. Clarke, (4) Robert A. Heinlein, (6) A. E. van
Vogt, and (8) Theodore Sturgeon.
The boundary between science fiction and fact is often at
issue in contemporary debates over the posthuman. Genetic
enhancement and longevity research provoke fervent debate
between those who favor such research and others who think it is
wrong to tamper with fundamental aspects of the human. Each
side thinks that distinguishing realistic possibilities from wild spec-
ulations is a priority. Comically, though, each side uses the epithet
“science fiction” as a way of trivializing the positions of the other,
while proclaiming that the research they cite is on the verge of
transforming human nature and that the future scenarios they
describe are plausible and impending. This article brings the bio-
ethical debate about posthumanism into contact with a massive,
culturally significant body of writing on the topic, popular science
fiction from the midtwentieth through the twenty-first centuries.
The nightmares of science fiction haunt the bioethical imagination,
exerting a pervasive but unexamined influence on its analyses. But
the failure of bioethicists to examine the images, metaphors, and
storylines of the science fiction that they so frequently invoke
distorts their findings and recommendations.
As is perhaps unsurprising, almost none of the people who
employ SF as an epithet have the foggiest idea of what they are
talking about. Most give no sign of ever having read any science
fiction, unless you count Brave New World (1932), which everyone
invokes without fail. In addition to Aldous Huxley’s dystopia,
they may have read well-publicized mainstream dystopias by estab-
lished literary figures, such as Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake
(2003) and Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005); most have
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seen a few dystopian movies (Gattaca [1997] is the most fre-
quently mentioned). But there is little evidence that they have
delved into the SF genre that they scorn. Hence you see over and
over again the mistaken notion that SF warns against the conse-
quences of biotechnology. Dystopia is a special branch of science
fiction, and the nightmare worlds of Brave New World and Oryx
and Crake are the exceptions, not the rule, in the larger universe
of SF. Popular cinema is a misleading indicator, too, since the film
industry relies on thriller conventions of conspiracy and disaster
far more than written forms of SF. Ronald Green conveys the
typical assumption when he writes, “the take-home lesson about
human gene modification [in science fiction] is wholly negative”
(7).2 Nothing could be farther from the case.
Science fiction is overwhelmingly positive about the possibil-
ity of transforming the human. The titles of two famous works in
the field capture the spirit in which SF approaches the topic:
Arthur C. Clarke’s Childhood’s End (1953) and Theodore
Sturgeon’s More Than Human (1953). These works, like so many
others, look forward to the day when humans leave the childhood
of their species behind and become more than human.3 Let me
emphasize one point, however. The interest of SF does not lie in
its “take-home lessons,” whether positive or negative. Nor does
the interest lie in whether the genre possesses aesthetic merit.
Rather, the interest for policy lies in what the genre shows about
the historical contexts that produced it and in the cultural attitudes
the genre reveals. Thus it is important to focus on what Darko
Suvin identifies as “the popular, ‘low,’ or plebeian literary produc-
tion of various times,” the “paraliterature” of SF, as I do here.
Suvin writes: “90 or even 95 percent of SF production is strictly
perishable stuff, produced in view of instant obsolescence for the
publisher’s profit and the writer’s acquisition of other perishable
commodities. But even this 90 or 95 percent is highly significant
from a sociological point of view, since it is read by the young
generation, the university graduates, and other key strata of
contemporary society” (vii). It matters whether the people who
dismiss science fiction actually understand the question at hand. The
erroneous belief that the genre is largely negative about biological
enhancement misrecognizes a significant strand in our culture.
The ease with which accusations of writing science fiction fit
the rhetorical purposes of both camps is revealing. It illustrates the
pervasiveness of what Istvan Cscicsery-Ronay, Jr., has called
“science-fictional habits of mind” (2). The reach of technology
into every aspect of our lives has so saturated our consciousness
“that we no longer treat sf as purely a genre-engine producing
formulaic effects, but rather as a kind of awareness we might call
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science-fictionality, a mode of response that frames and tests expe-
riences as if they were aspects of a work of science fiction” (2).
Others have pushed this point further. Colin Milburn argues that
the field of nanotechnology “should be viewed as simultaneously a
science and a science fiction” (25), not only because it employs
many of the same rhetorical tropes, conventions, and narrative
strategies in its promotional literature and venture capital funding
proposals, but also because the speculative worlds it imagines as a
consequence of as-yet-uninvented nanotechnology help drive
much of the research it undertakes. As a consequence, nanoscient-
ists often have to labor to disentangle their field from charges that
its claims smack of science fiction. Their efforts are self-defeating,
however. Milburn demonstrates at length that the very “rhetorical
strategies intended to distance their science from the negative asso-
ciations of science fiction . . . end up collapsing the distinction,
reinforcing the science fiction aspects of nano at the same time as
they rescue its scientific legitimacy” (24).
Much of the ethical discourse surrounding genetic enhance-
ment is inflected with “science-fictional habits of mind.”4 My
point is not that the science of genetics is itself constitutively
related to science fiction, as Milburn argues about nanotechnology,
but that the ethical discourse surrounding genetic enhancement is.
The bioethicists examined here rely on sweeping analogies and
engage in the kind of extrapolation that is the hallmark of SF.
Their underlying syntax is the question, what if? They ask us to
“frame and test experiences as if they were aspects of science
fiction” while enjoying the trust accorded to nonfiction. They con-
stitute a rhetorical genre of science writing, the nonfiction cousin
of science fiction, while borrowing their authority from the scien-
ces. We should be wary of drawing ethical conclusions from
science-fictional habits of mind without acknowledging their char-
acter and understanding their provenance.
The ethical and policy discourse on posthumanism differs
from the critical reflection on biopower and biopolitics that domi-
nates literary studies of the topic. Literary theorists of the posthu-
man typically trace their lineage to a few foundational sources:
Foucault’s late lectures on biopower, Donna Haraway’s writing on
transgressive, hybrid creatures (both cyborg and transgenic), and
N. Katherine Hayles’s work on the interpenetration of the cyber-
netic with the human. By and large, this body of thought wants to
break down the boundaries between science fiction and cultural
analysis, which is very much not the case in bioethics. For
example, literary critic Cary Wolfe insists that we must challenge
the norms of critical analysis, putting into question categories of
rationality, before we can come to terms with the posthuman: “the
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nature of thought itself must change if it is to be posthumanist”
(xvi). Wolfe’s work draws on animal studies, gender and race
theory, Lyotard and Derrida on the nonhuman, Luhmann’s systems
theory, as well as Foucault’s influential texts on biopower.
Similarly, Bruce Clarke invokes Gregory Bateson’s remark that
“the whole of logic would have to be reconstructed for recursive-
ness” (qtd. in Clarke 5) in justification for his belief that only
systems theory can come to terms with the radical potential of
posthuman metamorphosis. This vein of theory has become virtu-
ally hegemonic in literary and cultural studies of the posthuman.
By contrast, bioethicists and policy experts mean something
quite different when they speak of our posthuman future, to use
the title of Francis Fukuyama’s 2002 book. Bioethicists are more
likely to draw on economists, social scientists, and moral philoso-
phers than Foucault, Haraway, Lyotard, Derrida, or Luhmann.
Although few literary critics pay much attention to bioethics as a
field, it is a powerful discourse in today’s society, influencing
important policy decisions in government agencies, medical care,
human-subjects research, pharmaceutical corporations, agricultural
regulations, and much more.5 The debate in this area turns on
issues of human dignity, freedom of choice, personal autonomy,
patient privacy, and informed consent, not the deconstruction of
the subject. For Fukuyama, posthumanism is what you get when
you threaten our shared “human nature” (129), the “human
essence” (150) that “entitles every member of the species to a
higher moral status than the rest of the natural world” (160).
Hence the stakes are high in suggesting a kinship between
Fukuyama’s conception of the posthuman and science fiction.
In the pages that follow, I trace two different phases of SF’s
engagement with the posthuman, showing how those phases were
responses to their different historical moments and what they
reveal about attitudes toward transforming the human. During
WWII and the decade afterward, the so-called golden age of SF, a
whole raft of short stories and novels dealt with the advent of a
new species of human, what today we would refer to as the posthu-
man.6 A second wave, equally remarkable for its coherence and
prominence, began appearing in the late 1970s and 1980s, culmi-
nating in the years immediately preceding the millennium. The
typical plot form in both eras involves the persecution of the
emerging minority species by a terrified majority, the soon-to-be
extinct Homo sapiens. Invariably, evolutionary change is depicted
as sudden and teleological in character, resulting in a decisive step
forward to a higher evolutionary stage. I conclude the article by
discussing another wave of texts, this time nonfiction works pub-
lished since 2002. These works fall into two groups, the first of
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which consists of jeremiads by opponents of enhancement, Francis
Fukuyama, Leon R. Kass, and Michael J. Sandel—three scholars
who served together on the George W. Bush administration’s
President’s Council on Bioethics. The second group endorses
biological enhancement. They write in a genre of futurology for
which we lack a name, but we might refer to these works as
“encomia” or “anticipations,” after H. G. Wells’s book of that name,
which inaugurated the twentieth-century tradition of scientific futur-
ism. With titles like Wondergenes (2003) and Radical Evolution
(2004) these anticipations inflect bioethics with “the ludic pleasures
of estrangement” characteristic of science fiction (Suvin ix).
1. Around 1953
1953 was a banner year in Anglo-American science fiction.
The culmination of important trends in hard SF that took their
impetus from John W. Campbell’s editorship of the pulp magazine
Astounding Science Fiction, the year also marked the beginning of
important trends in paperback publication of SF and the profes-
sionalization of its writers. Ballantine Books published the first of
its science fiction original paperbacks in 1953, Frederik Pohl and
C. M. Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants, and ACE followed that
same year with its own line of SF originals (G. Wolfe 105–6).
The Hugo Award for the best science fiction novel of the year was
first given in 1953 to Alfred Bester’s The Demolished Man, which
beat out Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 and other classics of the
genre, including three of the books considered here: Clarke’s
Childhood’s End, Sturgeon’s More Than Human, and Lewis
Padgett’s Mutant (all but Bester’s novel published by Ballantine).
Van Vogt had inaugurated the spate of fiction about mutants in
1940 with Slan, and Heinlein had published the stories that would
become the fix-ups Beyond This Horizon and Methuselah’s
Children in Astounding in 1941 and 1942, while Padgett’s “Baldie
stories,” the core of Mutant, appeared in the same magazine in
1945. But 1953 may serve as a symbolic climax for the first wave
of SF about evolutionary change in humans. The publication of
James D. Watson and Francis Crick’s landmark article describing
the double helix structure of DNA in April 1953 appears to have
prompted SF writers to shift their focus when writing about evolu-
tion in ways that will shortly become clear, and by the end of the
decade, the genre had moved on to other concerns.
I focus exclusively on Anglo-American science fiction for
two complementary reasons. First, the genre fiction in this line
was directly shaped by the emphasis of the pulp magazines of the
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1940s, with which the name Campbell is closely associated.
Campbell emphasized “hard science” in his magazine and encour-
aged writers who speculated about a posthuman species to ground
their work in current understandings of evolution. Mark McGurl
has recently noted something important about the genre status of
these works: “the term genre fiction (its science fiction and horror
variants in particular) . . . names those literary forms willing to
risk artistic ludicrousness in their representation of the inhumanly
large and long” (539). That ludicrousness makes the juxtaposition
with policy analysis all the more startling. Second, the threat of
totalitarianism—first from the fascist right, and during the Cold
War years from the communist left—shaped the rebellious youth
culture that consumed American pulp science fiction in ways that I
shall shortly explore.
In the 1940s, the lack of knowledge about DNA’s role in
evolution left SF writers with two chief mechanisms for imagining
genetic change: eugenics and mutation. Eugenics had loomed
large in the American consciousness in the first half of the twenti-
eth century, with debate about selective breeding plans and sterili-
zation or extermination for the unfit intensifying in the 1930s as
Nazi eugenics campaigns drew increasing notice. After WWII,
when word spread about the effects of radiation on survivors of
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mutations caused by
nuclear warfare became an obvious plot device for fiction about
evolution.
For Heinlein, eugenics was the method of choice for chang-
ing the human species. A committed social Darwinist, a libertarian
who championed freedom of the individual above all other values,
and a believer (like Wells before him) in the innate aristocracy of
the gifted few, he vigorously advocated only “positive” eugenics,
which encouraged selective breeding through incentives, rather
than “negative” eugenic policies involving coerced sterilization
or extermination. Self-interest and merciless competition for
survival would weed out the unfit, or so Heinlein’s rugged heroes
proclaimed in story after story.7
In his antipathy for coercive measures, Heinlein was in step
with the growth and eventual dominance of “reform eugenics” in
England and America from the mid-1930s onward.8 Beyond This
Horizon imagines a future society where the best genetic lines are
encouraged by Moderators from the Eugenics Board who employ
family pedigrees and chromosome charts to encourage “star lines”
to interbreed. The only genetic interventions that occur involve
pre-implantation screening of embryos to select the optimum
combination of genes. In imagining this future office, Heinlein
reflected the cutting edge of reform in eugenics; the 1940s saw a
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shift away from large-scale better-breeding programs and racial
hygiene, which had already become tainted by association with
German eugenics, toward marriage counseling, family planning,
and beginning in 1946, genetic counseling (Kevles 254).
Methuselah’s Children similarly features incentive programs for
people from chosen genetic lines marrying one another. The novel
imagines the establishment of the Howard Foundation in 1875 to
support a selective breeding program for longevity. By 2136, when
the novel opens, the hero Lazarus Long is 215; we learn later that
he possesses a rare favorable mutation, but others in the family are
more than 180 years old.
The suspicion of genetic engineering runs throughout the first
wave of SF novels, coexisting uneasily with enthusiasm for the
arrival of a posthuman stage. Both Heinlein and van Vogt inveigh
against tampering directly with the germ line. Although their genet-
ics fiction was written in 1940–1942, before most of the Nazi
medical atrocities had become public knowledge, the antipathy
toward genetic engineering seems aimed at warding off the specter
of German eugenics. Nazi coercive measures clearly ran against
Heinlein’s grain. Beyond This Horizon contains a long, clumsy
passage of exposition recounting the horrors of the genetic experi-
ments of past centuries, when the “race acquired the techniques of
artificial selection without knowing what to select” (26). No free,
individualistic society, we are told, would tolerate engineering
humans for particular traits, which would lead either to homogeni-
zation of the species, or its opposite, overspecialization. “Only
under absolutism could the genetic experiments . . . have been
performed, for they required a total indifference to the welfare of
individuals” (27). Similarly, van Vogt’s Slan alludes to the infa-
mous blood libel against Jews—the slans are accused of kidnapping
human babies for experiments designed to create more slans—a
libel that dates back at least to the middle ages but was given new
life by National Socialism. To dispel such charges against his slans,
van Vogt repudiates the existence of any means of artificially tam-
pering with genes. A crucial turn in the plot reveals that “[a]ll slans
are natural mutations” (175), not the product of experimentation.
A second reason for the avoidance of genetic engineering
was confidence that evolutionary pressures alone would do the
trick. This confidence in natural selection, though, reveals its own
set of ideological confusions: Like so many people of the time, SF
writers saw evolutionary change as teleological, a progressive
movement toward ever higher stages of life. Nature was viewed as
working according to a plan, purposefully directing human evolu-
tion toward a superior species. “Our mutation wasn’t due for
another thousand years” (140), a character remarks in Padgett’s
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Mutant, and another explains that radioactive fallout “brought us
telepaths into being ahead of our normal mutation time” (146).
Lines such as these could have appeared in virtually any of the SF
from the period that dealt with evolution.
A related confusion led authors to envision species change as
sudden, occurring over one generation. Recall the Arthur C. Clarke
quote with which this article began (number 2 in the list): “it will
be cataclysmic—instantaneous” (181). The passage in Childhood’s
End continues: “yours is the last generation of Homo sapiens. . . .
You have given birth to your successors” (181). In these novels,
bewildered parents discover that they have nurtured mutants with
dramatic new powers. It happens not only in Clarke’s Childhood’s
End, but van Vogt’s Slan, Heinlein’s Beyond This Horizon,
Sturgeon’s More Than Human, Padgett’s Mutant, and Judith
Merril’s classic story “That Only a Mother” (1948).
Without exception, the “upgrade” to the species is a mental
power, usually telepathy. Clarke’s children move quickly beyond
telepathy to telekinesis.9 Van Vogt’s Slan and Padgett’s Mutant
feature two rival species of telepaths, battling for dominance in the
posthuman world while hiding from human pogroms. The Howard
Families in Methuselah’s Children contain telepathic “sensitives”
among their offspring, and when the reluctant hero from the “star
line” in Beyond This Horizon finally marries his eugenically
selected partner, they produce the telepathic child the Eugenics
Board had been seeking. Sturgeon could be summing matters up
for all his fellow authors when he writes: “The next important evo-
lutionary step in man would be in a psychic rather than a physical
direction” (109).10
Telepathy turns out to be a means to another end in most of
the works: merging individuals into a larger collective mind.
Clarke is the most radical. He envisions a single Overmind of all
the telepathic children on earth, possessed of such awesome
powers that they eventually consume the planet itself and move
out into space as a disembodied being (shades of the Arisians in
E. E. Smith’s Lensmen series [1934–48]). Sturgeon explores the
concept of minds merging in more psychological terms. The novel
consists of three long parts: a central section, “Baby Is Three,”
that was a Hugo award-winning story about the workings of
trauma, repression, and memory recovery through psychoanalysis,
and two flanking narratives, somewhat awkwardly constructed to
give “Baby Is Three” a backstory and a conclusion. The climax of
the book is the achievement of a fused multiple identity they call
Homo Gestalt (170). Heinlein, who loathes the idea of subordinating
human individuality to a larger unit, has his long-lived Howard
Families encounter and reject the temptations offered by an alien
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species that exists in “rapport groups” of 90 or more minds
(Franklin 42–43).
The fact that science still understood little about the actual
mechanism of heredity did not dim SF’s enthusiasm for plots of
species evolution. Until Oswald Avery’s work in the mid-1940s, it
was not even clear that DNA was the part of the chromosome that
mattered in inheritance.11 The very confusions of the novels—such
as their vision of evolutionary change as progressive—served the
plot requirements of an action genre that had long relied on wars
between alien species (the plot, complete with evolutionary
themes, dates back to Wells’s The War of the Worlds [1898]).
Genetics merely gave a new air of authenticity to an old storyline.
Belief that survival of one species and the extinction of another
vindicated the superiority of the winner had been a common con-
fusion since Darwin’s day. Genetics allowed novelists to transpose
the conflict inward. Rather than externalizing the struggle among
species to interplanetary warfare, SF could bring the battle down
to earth, as it were, shifting the strife to the personal realm and
locating superiority in mental attributes.
The animus against genetic engineering would not survive
the excitement surrounding Watson and Crick’s discovery of the
structure of DNA. SF quickly adopted gene “modding” as
the chosen method of creating a posthuman species. James Blish’s
The Seedling Stars (1957), the last-composed of this wave of SF
about genetics, employs a more informed technical vocabulary and
describes in detail the techniques of modifying the germ line to
produce new species of humans—so-called Adapted Men—for
extraterrestrial life on nonearthlike planets.12 Blish, who trained as
a biologist at Rutgers and worked for Pfizer, may have been
specially attuned to the significance of Watson and Crick’s
breakthrough, but even Heinlein became interested in biomedical
(in addition to evolutionary) explanations for changes to the
species. In the only significant revision to the 1941 serial version
of Methuselah’s Children prior to its first book publication in
1958, he alters his explanation of how normal humans discovered
the secret of longevity, which the Howard Families had achieved
via eugenics. In 1941, the secret lay in altering the “radioactive
qualities” of certain vitamins (“Methuselah’s” 161). In 1958, the
secret has become biomedical, the transfusion of new blood
produced in vitro from bone marrow (MC 154–55).
What is it about this particular nexus of themes that attracted
SF writers in the years 1940–53? Why do fantasies of teleological
evolution, species change, longevity, psychic powers, collective
minds, the persecution of minorities, and the extinction of human-
ity come to be associated in work after work? How does this
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constellation of ideas reflect public knowledge of genetics at the
time and what can such confused notions about genetics contribute
to bioethical debates today?
One way to answer these questions is to approach science
fiction as addressing larger cultural anxieties. Like the myths
studied by Claude Lévi-Strauss, the books offer imaginary solu-
tions to real social problems. The roles of telepathic communica-
tion and collective identity have sometimes been attributed to the
interest of John W. Campbell in parapsychology (Luckhurst 410).
This may be the case; Luckhurst quotes Campbell’s remark that he
used Astounding Science Fiction to promote fiction about ESP.
But the fantasy of mental communion with others responds to a
wider cultural condition, the ambivalent attraction to authoritarian
structures that Erich Fromm so memorably charted in his 1942
book Escape from Freedom. SF’s depiction of merged identity
speaks to both the longing and the fear provoked by the spectacle
of a world confronting totalitarian regimes, whether fascist or
communist, which submerged the good of the individual to that of
the group. Passionately idealistic, as much SF tended to be at the
time, these works responded to the urge for communal identity,
but simultaneously paid homage to rebellion and nonconformity.
Readers felt themselves part of a communal group, but only
because they were among the special few. The fusion of these
contradictory impulses was a major part of the genre’s appeal. It
was a haven for people who saw themselves as farsighted, misun-
derstood nonconformists, persecuted by an uncomprehending
majority, but who paradoxically banded together in tight-knit fan
communities of fellow believers (Mendlesohn 10). Witness the
subcultural phenomenon of “slan shacks,” group-living arrange-
ments for SF fans, who used to refer to outsiders as “mundanes”
(Coger). The constellation of ideas surrounding species change
spurred generic innovation in the field of SF while serving as a
vehicle for the contradictory affect of the post-WWII era.13
This incoherent affect was not unique to the world of SF but
surfaced as a current in other sectors of society: Beat poetry and
jazz circles, popular films such as Rebel without a Cause (1955),
mainstream bestsellers such as The Lonely Crowd (1950) and The
Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1956), and fiction favored by
teenage nonconformists such as The Catcher in the Rye (1951) and
Siddhartha (1922; US publication 1951). Such phenomena help us
recognize SF’s vogue for telepathic union as what Fredric Jameson
calls an “ideologeme,” a unit of narrative that “transmits a histori-
cal or a social message” (322). Fantasies of a new species, born of
the union of extraordinary individuals, played to idealism about a
collective society but stripped the idea of its threat to the
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individual and of its political dimension. The same was true of the
racial allegory that ran through many of these texts. Their repudia-
tion of racial prejudice, frequently thematized in characters who
marveled at bias based on something as trivial as skin color,
catered to the fantasy of reconciling the races without political
struggle.
The ideologeme of post-WWII science fiction about evolu-
tionary change thus does not have the meanings commonly attrib-
uted to it in bioethics today. Neither does the genre’s short-lived
antipathy to genetic engineering. Both responded to social and
political concerns far removed from arguments about genetic
enhancement in the twenty-first century. The temptation to use SF
as a prop for advocacy for or against biotechnology fundamentally
mistakes the cultural message of the genre around 1953. What the
first wave of SF about genetics reveals, instead, is the importance
of understanding scientific developments in their full social, politi-
cal, and cultural contexts. The field of bioethics could benefit
from literary approaches to science, but few of us engage with the
issues that confront science policy today.
After Blish’s The Seedling Stars (1957), there was little SF
about genetics for more than 20 years. A recent review of
“Science Fiction and the Life Sciences” by Joan L. Slonczewski
and Michael Levy suggests that a growing interest in environmen-
talism, which intensified after publication of Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring (1962), stimulated SF writers to turn their attention
toward ecological issues, producing imaginative explorations of
alien ecosystems such as Dune (1965) and The Left Hand of
Darkness (1969). Another likely factor was the rise of the counter-
culture and new social movements concerned with minority and
gender issues, which led to increased emphasis on fiction about
altered states of consciousness and changed racial and sexual
norms, especially in New Wave SF. In any event, almost no
science fiction confronted questions of evolution and genetics in
any depth until the excitement about recombinant DNA reignited
interest in the mid-1970s.
2. Approaching 2001
The same themes of human species change, extrasensory
communication, and collective modes of experience reappear,
updated for a genomic age, in the science fiction published in the
25 years leading up to the millennium. There are two crucial shifts
of emphasis, however. First, because species change is brought
about by deliberate genetic manipulation, there is less stress on
What the first wave of
SF about genetics reveals
. . . is the importance of
understanding scientific
developments in their full
social, political, and
cultural contexts. The
field of bioethics could
benefit from literary
approaches to science,
but few of us engage with
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a teleological conception of evolution. The ability to modify the
genetic code means that alterations in the human form are chosen,
and are not the result of evolution, whether blind or directed.
(Greg Bear’s novels are an important exception, as we shall see).
These books have fully assimilated the notion that “[w]ith our bio-
logical research we are taking control of evolution and beginning
to direct it,” to quote one of the bioethicists from the beginning of
this article, not a science fiction novelist (Stock 17). Second,
diversity of form within the species is prominent. An obvious
thematization of multicultural racial diversity, the plea for biologi-
cally diverse beings to find areas of commonality is framed as the
only hope for descendents of humanity in a hostile universe.
Transformation and species diversity are seen as survival charac-
teristics; continuous adaptation and flexibility about the boundaries
of the acceptable are primary values.
Both of these developments—acceptance of artificial repro-
duction and respect for diversity—are signs of how the subculture
of SF genre fiction had joined other new social movements such as
feminism, queer and transsexual politics, disability rights, and
multiculturalism to stake out a distinctive, countercultural position
in opposition to prevailing trends in the Nixon–Regan years.
Although many women active in feminist causes reacted against
invasive biomedical technology in matters of reproduction, science
fiction emphasized the thematics of reproductive choice to align
its brief for genetic engineering with women’s rights. Octavia
Butler’s more complicated portrayal—the Xenogenesis trilogy
(1987–89) supports genetic manipulation of the species but does
not hide its relationship to other kinds of violence against
women—stands out in contrast to some of the other SF of the
period. In the 1990s, transgender, transsexual, and prosthetic
choices grew in prominence, particularly in cyberpunk fiction,
though this theme had influential precursors in the fiction of
Ursula K. Le Guin and Joanna Russ. The brief for diversity within
the species was less conflicted. If the racial politics of the first
wave of posthuman SF was predominantly liberal (or sometimes
libertarian) in its advocacy of equal rights and tolerance, the
sexual and racial politics of the second wave reveals its affinities
with the New Left in its embrace of hybridity.
Both the continuity and the difference between the two
phases can be brought out by comparing the last of the 1950s SF
in this vein, James Blish’s The Seedling Stars (1957), with an
early example of the later phase, John Varley’s The Ophiuchi
Hotline (1977). Blish’s Adapted Men did not evolve through
natural selection but were engineered in the laboratory for life in
alien environments. Outlawed and hunted on Earth, they become
American Literary History 329
the pioneers of humanity’s expansion into space. Foreshadowing
later SF motifs, they prosper in all their myriad forms, growing
into the majority and leaving the “basic human type” (156)
behind. The moral could not be stated more plainly: “It’s only sen-
sible to go on evolving with the universe” (151).
Varley’s novel opens with criminal charges alleging that the
heroine “did willfully and knowingly conduct experiments upon
human genetic material . . . [and] did produce human blastocysts
and embryos reflecting potential structures atypical of the permit-
ted spectrum of Humanity” (1). This felony is one of the few
offences punishable by death and the total eradication of all copies
of the criminal’s genotype, preventing future cloning of the mis-
creant. The ban on radical genetic experiments had been meant to
be only a moratorium, but it had hardened into a prohibition that
lasted for 500 years. (This detail alludes to the voluntary morato-
rium on recombinant DNA research that led up to the historic
Asilomar Conference of 1975, a gathering of scientists and ethi-
cists that developed guidelines for how to pursue further research
in the area safely.) As any veteran SF reader would anticipate,
the rebel against the novel’s genetics laws turns out to be one of
the saviors of humanity, which was dooming itself in its struggle
against alien invaders by clinging to human racial purity. The
moral in this case is as plain as in Blish’s earlier novel: “You will
have to cease defining your race by something as arbitrary as a
genetic code, and make the great leap to establishing a racial
awareness that will hold together in spite of the physical differen-
ces you will be introducing among yourselves” (Varley 159).
The renewed surge of interest in genetics picked up speed in
the second half of the 1980s with the publication of influential
fiction by Bruce Sterling (Schismatrix [1985] and five related
stories) and Octavia Butler. Sterling, one of the cofounders of
the cyberpunk movement, and Butler, a noted African-American
and feminist writer, stretched the boundary of the genre in several
ways. Sterling’s future interplanetary society, nicknamed the
Schismatrix, is divided between posthumans who have used
cyborg implants to transcend the human body and others who have
used genetics to the same end. Warring with one another, the two
camps (and other splinter factions) live in the shadow of alien
Investors, possessing vastly superior technology which they use to
promote their interstellar trading empire. Bruce Clarke reproaches
Sterling for retailing “an all-too-human oppositionalism” in the
war between the two camps (160), reflecting the tendency of
literary theorists of posthumanism to evaluate SF according to how
staunchly it resists the tendency to fall back into humanism
(Milburn levels similar charges against James Blish’s “Surface
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Tension,” 96–106). But Sterling’s solution to the dilemma of uni-
fying the species after it has splintered apart into incommensurate
posthuman forms rejects this “oppositionalism” and adopts instead
a posthuman philosophy developed by the (real-life) complexity
theorist, Ilya Prigogine. Prigogine’s version of complexity offers
the characters in the fractured world of the Schismatrix a model of
self-organizing structures, which become intelligible only from the
perspective of a higher level of organization. “By the term we,
I don’t mean . . . humanity,” one character remarks (273). We can
be applied to any group of beings that has organized itself on a
sufficient level of complexity, regardless of their external form.
“It’s time we learned to stop looking for solid ground to stand
on. . . . Posthumanism offers fluidity and freedom” (274).
Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy adopts the motif of interstellar
Traders, too, (a familiar topos in SF, not a borrowing from
Sterling). The Oankali travel the galaxy in search of interesting
genomes with which to merge their own. “We trade the essence of
ourselves. Our genetic material for yours,” one of the Traders
explains. “We do what you would call genetic engineering. . . . It
renews us, enables us to survive as an evolving species instead of
specializing ourselves into extinction or stagnation” (39). They
create new, hybrid species, a mixing that captures the spirit of
postmodern theories of deterritorialization, fluid economies, and
hybridity, as Gabriele Schwab and many others have pointed
out.14 The unfortunate consequence, from the humans’ perspective,
is that humanity disappears as a species, merging into the new
Oankali/human hybrid. (Echoing the resolution of other SF works
in this vein, a tiny remnant of old humanity is given the option of
going its own way by being transplanted to Mars.) Butler’s novels
embrace this prospect for humanity, welcoming a posthuman
future as the only possible mode of survival for a species that has
already destroyed its world through nuclear warfare and is on the
verge of extinction. Humanity is doomed because of its deadly
combination of intelligence and the instinct for hierarchy.
By now, it should be apparent that acceptance, even advo-
cacy, of a posthuman future is the norm, not the exception in SF
about the posthuman. We have seen it throughout the first and
second periods of interest in this topic—perhaps most memorably
enshrined by the conclusion of Clarke’s Childhood’s End, when
humanity’s child, the Overmind, consumes all the substance of
Earth and sets out for the stars.15 At the end of the third volume in
Butler’s series, the hybrid descendants of what used to be the
Oankali and human species accept a similar fate for Earth—they
will consume the planet for fuel, leaving behind a cold, lifeless
husk when they depart for the stars. What is distinctive about
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Butler’s handling of this plot is how nakedly she depicts the vio-
lence of these conflicts, the racial hatred, the fear of difference, the
brutality of strong against weak, the ineradicable stain of sexual
violence, the hierarchical impulse that condemns the old species,
our species, to extinction.
The great anomaly among the second phase of SF novels
about genetics is Greg Bear’s two-part series, Darwin’s Radio
(1999) and Darwin’s Children (2003). Although the novels incor-
porate all three of the main thematic concerns—sudden species
change, extrasensory communication, and group consciousness—
and feature plots involving persecution of the posthuman minority
by humanity, they differ from their contemporary peers by attribut-
ing species change not to genetic engineering but to evolution and
by reasserting the directed nature of speciation. Bear updates the
evolutionary paradigm by recourse to cutting edge but sometimes
controversial research; the result is an effective appearance of a
scientific rationale for directed evolution. In an afterword, Bear
forthrightly admits that “it is very likely that many of the specula-
tions here will turn out to be wrong” (Darwin’s Radio 527), but
the speculations stem from extrapolations from current research.
Bear’s novel was billed as a crossover work, a techno-thriller
in the mode of contagion narratives like Michael Creighton’s The
Andromeda Strain (1969) or Robin Cook’s Outbreak (1989) rather
than a work of science fiction, but the SF community was not
about to let such a work go unclaimed, and so gave it the Nebula
Award for 2000.16 Scientific thrillers give authors more latitude
for expository conversations among researchers and government
bureaucrats even than SF because the technical information itself
is seen as a source of the genre’s appeal, and both of Bear’s
novels end with glossaries of scientific terms. Thriller conventions
differ as well from mainline SF in featuring capsule character
sketches whenever a new actor comes on the scene, gratuitous sex
scenes, point-of-view shifts to facilitate speed of narration, and
quick cuts between exotic locales, each labeled with a place
heading (the Alps, Tbilisi, New York, NIH headquarters in
Washington, CDC in Atlanta, an archaeology dig in Washington
state). I bring up the presence of these conventions in Bear’s series
not only as an aesthetic issue but to underline the point that this
fictional genre—like SF, with its reliance on different narrative
formulas—is immediately recognizable as fiction, despite its
parade of scientific information.
The truth is, scientific thrillers and science fiction are better
suited to this kind of thought experiment than most of the nonfic-
tion about posthumanism that aims to influence public policy. The
formal conventions of fiction alert readers to the provisional nature
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of analogy and extrapolation. As many critics have pointed out,
science fiction does not pretend to predict the future or give
prophecies of things to come. By contrast, nonfiction advocacy
about the posthuman does exactly that: It specializes in prophesies
and predictions. This difference is part of what is at stake in
emphasizing SF’s fictionality. Coleridge famously wrote that liter-
ature required a “willing suspension of disbelief,” but the act of
willing oneself to enter an imaginary world affords a kind of
safeguard against taking possible futures as inevitable (or even
probable in any testable way). Fiction does not have to pass a test
of verifiability; it has its own procedures for establishing what
counts as plausible, and one rarely mistakes those procedures for
truth claims. Ironically, nonfiction about the posthuman is more
susceptible to the ridicule of time than works of SF.
In the next section, I turn to nonfiction prophecies of the
coming posthuman age. The purpose of this juxtaposition is not to
demonstrate any formal similarities—quite the contrary. My point
has been the large generic discontinuity between fictional and
nonfictional strategies. Nor is it to accuse this body of nonfiction
of factual distortions even remotely like the speculations of SF.
Despite the many thematic similarities among these books, the
comparison has nothing to do with their relative accuracy. No, the
grounds of comparison lie in the rhetorical dependence of this
body of nonfiction on modes of reality-testing and future thinking
developed by science fiction.
3. Jeremiads and Encomia
In an influential work of American studies, Sacvan
Bercovitch coined the phrase “American jeremiad” to describe an
eighteenth-century genre of political sermon that set the tone for
much brooding upon the destiny of our nation for the next two
centuries. The New England Puritans intended their mode of
public exhortation “to join social criticism to spiritual renewal,
public to private identity, the shifting ‘signs of the times’ to
certain traditional metaphors, themes, and symbols” (Bercovitch
xi). The result was to construct a “myth of America” and “clothe
history as fiction,” but the myth succeeded “in proportion to its
capacity to help people act in history. Ultimately, its effectiveness
derive[d] from its functional relationship to facts” (Bercovitch xi).
Bercovitch’s account of the American jeremiad indicates
what I mean by calling the writings on posthumanism by Kass,
Sandel, and Fukuyama “jeremiads.” The rhetoric is fierce enough
to qualify. Kass compares “posthuman Brave New Worlders” to
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“inhuman Osama bin Ladens” and maintains that genetic engineer-
ing fosters a “soft dehumanization” as pernicious as “the cruel
dehumanization of Nazi and Soviet tyranny” (4, 7); Sandel talks of
“designing parents,” of “hubris,” and of “the one-sided triumph of
willfulness” (46, 85); Fukuyama chooses “Transhumanism” as his
contribution to a series of articles in Foreign Policy on “The
World’s Most Dangerous Ideas” (2004). But it is not merely fierce
rhetoric that revives the spirit of the Old Testament prophet; it is
the ambition to spur spiritual renewal through social criticism
and to counter shifting signs of the time—genetic enhancement,
longevity research—by recourse to traditional metaphors, themes,
and symbols.
The new wrinkle that scientific jeremiads bring to the genre
is their covert relationship to science fiction. The works’ ability to
spur people to act in history depends on inducing readers to
“frame and test experiences as if they were aspects of science
fiction.” Their effectiveness depends on a certain functional rela-
tionship to facts, as Bercovitch said of the Puritan sermon. That
functionality relies on readers who are accustomed to taking fan-
tastic futures seriously. There is an important place in bioethics for
thinking about the consequences of new technologies, of course.
But researchers in the field expect future scenarios to be grounded
in evidence and to employ testable methods such as economic
modeling, surveys of attitudes and trends, studies of how technolo-
gies are actually used by different populations, or historical analy-
sis of medicine and science. Research-based attempts to forecast
future trends are often framed in a distinctive vocabulary; they are
termed “projections,” and their predictive character is subject to
disconfirmation by new data. By contrast, scientific jeremiads
rarely restrict themselves to the evidence base or to projecting
trends. Instead they rely on blurring the genre between research-
based projections and scientific fictionality. The power to mobilize
citizens comes from the ease with which readers have learned to
extrapolate from facts that could entail a particular imagined
future. Of course, the same facts could entail a radically different
future or be largely irrelevant to what eventually occurs. But the
call to action in scientific jeremiads elides such possibilities.
One sees the power of this disposition toward scientific
extrapolation when one comes up against communities in our
nation who do not share it. Think of how bewildering it strikes
most Americans when a fundamentalist espouses an eschatological
vision involving imminent Rapture or when climate-change skep-
tics deny the long-term forecasts of environmental science. Trust
in a scientific vision of the future, though, has little to do with
one’s ability to assess the science itself, something beyond the
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reach of most people. Rather, it comes in part from a willing
suspension of disbelief in scientific extrapolation.
For scientific jeremiads, the rhetorical challenge is to counter
science-fictional scenarios with a set of rival metaphors derived
not from the future but from the past, metaphors chiefly concern-
ing human nature, natural rights, and human dignity. As philoso-
phers and political theorists, these writers give accounts of their
terms as concepts, not metaphors, and the extensive debate about
their work has largely taken them at their word, investigating
logical flaws in their arguments.17 But the rhetorical power of the
terms functions independently from their logical coherence.
The rhetorical elements in the works are legion: hyperbole,
personification, analogy, guilt by association, symbolic opposition,
performative speech acts, leading questions, organic metaphors,
and more. But all writing is figurative, and identifying such tropes
will hardly surprise readers. It is not the constitutive role of figura-
tive language in their arguments that matters, but the functional
motivation of these tropes. Scientific jeremiads attempt to motivate
people to act in history—to resist a feared future—by conjuring a
“novum,” to use Darko Suvin’s term for the new reality science
fiction creates. These jeremiads warn against an “alternate reality
logically necessitated by and proceeding from” a fiction (Suvin
75). This totalizing rhetorical strategy, as effective in nonfiction as
science fiction, can only be tested by recourse to the sensibilities
one uses to judge SF. Is the novum believable? The jeremiad,
however, has designs on the reader—it calls on one to accept a
science fiction novum as a reason to act in history.
The rhetorical strategies the genre of scientific jeremiads uses
to create a novum can be reduced to three basic forms: (1) per-
formative speech, (2) symbolic oppositions, and (3) metaphors of
organicism. Sandel is the great practitioner of performative rhet-
oric. Again and again, dozens of times in his very short book, The
Case against Perfection (2009), Sandel states that “we” are made
uneasy by some aspect of genetic enhancement, asserting in a
performative speech act what he ought to be proving. The basic
rhetorical move goes like this: “And yet something about the ad
leaves a lingering moral qualm” (3); “And yet there is something
unsettling about the prospect of genetically altered athletes” (8);
“There is something unsettling about the specter of genetically
altered athletes lifting SUVs or hitting 650-foot home runs or
running a three-minute mile” (12). He never makes any effort to
document that people are made uneasy by such phenomena. Some
people may be, although it is clear from the clamoring voices in
favor of enhancement that many are not. Hence it is incumbent on
Sandel to demonstrate, rather than just assert, that “we” are
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queasy. Instead, he immediately follows up these assertions with
leading questions: “But what exactly is troubling about these
scenarios?” (12); “Is the scenario troubling because the unen-
hanced poor are denied the benefits of bioengineering, or because
the enhanced affluent are somehow dehumanized?” (15–16). Any
possible answer grants his premise.
Kass deploys symbolic oppositions pitting “us” against
“them” with similar fluency. One of his favorite moves is to sort
those who agree with him into a valorized group and those who
disagree into people “who can’t see or don’t care about what lies
ahead” (10). The latter is made up of “scientists and biotechnolo-
gists, their entrepreneurial backers and a cheering claque of sci-fi
enthusiasts, futurologists and libertarians” (6). His group, by con-
trast, “sees all too clearly where the train is headed”; his group
“can distinguish cleverness about means from wisdom about ends,
and we are loath to entrust the future of the race to those who
cannot tell the difference” (6). If one differs from Kass, then
one is either blind or uncaring, and in any event, cannot tell the
difference between means and ends. The passage concludes with a
tautology about being a friend of humanity: “No friend of human-
ity cheers for a posthuman future” (6).
What Bercovitch says about the Puritan jeremiad applies
as forcefully to Kass’s book: “The rhetoric plainly substitutes sym-
bolic for social analysis” (Bercovitch 177). Here’s how Bercovitch
explains the problem with this procedure. “Symbolic analysis . . .
confines us to the alternatives generated by the symbol itself. It
may suggest unexpected meanings, but only within a fixed, bipolar
system. . . . We can understand what is being represented only by
measuring it against its opposite, or by placing it within a series of
comparable and related oppositions” (177–78). It is hard to think
of a better example of how symbolic analysis confines a person to
alternatives generated by the symbol itself than a line such as this
one in Kass: “Because to say ‘yes’ to baby manufacture is to say
‘no’ to all natural human relations” (19). All natural human
relations?
Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman Future is the most temperate,
thoughtful, and persuasive book of the three, but it is a jeremiad
all the same. The core of the book is a carefully argued set of
chapters defining and defending what Kass and Sandel leave
vague, the concept of human nature. His arguments draw on evolu-
tionary biology and psychology to provide a ground for speaking
of human nature without resorting to religious assumptions. I do
not debate whether these arguments hold, but only focus on the
rhetorical moments where his quasi-biological defense of the
concept of human nature slides into generalizations about what it
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is natural to desire, think, and do. Students of romanticism have
long been aware of what Paul de Man termed the “intentional
structure” of the organicist metaphor, which underlay so much
literature and philosophy of the period. The characteristic effect of
this metaphor was to import a temporal dimension into a substan-
tive quality, giving to a concept such as nature the appearance
of entailing (“intending”) particular ideas, feelings, or modes of
being. Something is natural because it appears to originate in
nature, not because it differs from the artificial or the unnatural.
Clearly, if one thinks about it for a minute, one realizes that artifi-
cial things trace their origins back to nature. Everything originates
in nature, even society (if a religious origin is discounted, as it is
by Fukuyama). This is as true of cloning as it is of queer sexuality
or anything else that a conservative commentator might want to
condemn as unnatural. You cannot call something natural merely
because it originates in nature—you must find some other way to
define the unnatural, if that is your agenda.
When Fukuyama claims to have proven that human nature
“serves to provide us with guidance as to what political orders
won’t work” (127) because they are not “natural,” we see the
organicist metaphor structuring his thought. The “failure of com-
munism” occurred because of the “failure to respect the natural
inclination to favor kin and private property” (127). When he says
“Human beings have been wired by evolution to be social crea-
tures” (124), he makes a statement about what human nature is,
based on claims put forward by evolutionary psychology. When he
moves on to say humans have “natural tendencies” and “natural
human desires” (126–27), he makes a different kind of statement
about where certain tendencies and desires originate. The inten-
tional structure of the metaphor of organic growth lends the latter
statement much of its power.
Let me turn to the other side, the pro-enhancement books
that have glutted the market. The same rhetorical elements can be
found in these texts, too. The group of encomia or anticipations of
scientific developments are, if anything, more dependent than the
jeremiad on the habits and sensibilities cultivated by science
fiction. The language of their titles is rich with tropes that evoke a
novum: Genetics will enable us to redesign humans, make better
people, exploit our wondergenes, reach our inevitable genetic
future, assist in radical evolution, and design our babies.18 The
three strategies of performative speech, symbolic oppositions, and
organicist metaphors are deployed just as prominently. On the
surface, the kinship of anticipations with science fiction would
appear to be greater than that of jeremiads, but both nonfiction
genres are the cousins, as I said earlier, of the SF they scorn.
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An unmistakable sign of their affiliation lies in their continual
invocation of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. Both Kass and
Fukuyama devote substantial parts of their opening chapters to
discussing Huxley’s dystopia, and Stock, Mehlman, Garreau, and
Green all take time to distinguish what they are advocating from
Huxley’s vision. The continuity they assume between a renowned
fictional future and their own nonfiction scenarios makes the point.
Science-fictional habits of mind are implicit preconditions of all
these texts.
If Huxley’s looming shadow is not enough, there is another
piece of science fiction that is invoked several times, although
none of the authors make clear that they are quoting a fiction. Lee
Silver frames his anticipation of genetics, Remaking Eden: How
Genetic Engineering and Cloning Will Transform the American
Family (1998), with an amusing fiction, in the form of a commis-
sion report in the year 2350, detailing worries about the GenRich
and the Naturals diverging to form two incompatible species.
Silver cribs the idea of an imaginary future lecturer from J. B. S.
Haldane’s “Daedalus, or Science in the Future” (1923), and
Silver’s imaginings are every bit as speculative. Fukuyama,
however, references this future scenario without letting on that it
is a fiction. Ronald Green, at least, follows his discussion of
Silver’s “troubling prediction” (Green 135) by a discussion of
H. G. Wells’s vision of the Morlocks and Eloi in The Time
Machine (1895). But Green never directly states that Silver’s
worry is a fantasy, not a prediction. Such slippage illustrates the
kinship these works bear to our culture’s science fiction.
Like jeremiads, scientific anticipations aspire to be prophetic,
but theirs is a more prosaic form of prophecy, one that cannot
trace its lineage from the warnings of Biblical seers. They traffic
in mundane predictions, and their attempts to inspire awe at
biotechnology’s wonders sometimes result merely in the feeling of
“gee whiz.” Their predictions risk being disproven by the next
twist or turn of history; the best they can aim for is the hit-or-miss
success rate typical of Wells’s prognostications (and he had an
unusually high record of successes). Both jeremiad and the
encomia have their uses, but the latter especially courts the ridicule
of time.
In this article, I have attempted to demonstrate that literary ap-
proaches to the posthuman have much to contribute to the debate
over genetic enhancement. Literary analysis could help prevent
policy makers and social commentators from generalizing glibly
about cultural attitudes from a sample size consisting of a few
decontextualized novels and films. The relationship of science
fiction to concepts of the posthuman is only one example of the
338 Science Fiction, Bioethics, and the Posthuman
many ways literary critics could enrich the discourse around im-
portant social issues. Experts in bioethics and medical humanities
are generally receptive to literary approaches to the questions they
study. It is our own discipline that has been slow to take up the
challenge. Literary reflections on the posthuman have much to
offer society. It is up to us to bring the analysis of posthumanism
to bear on problems with tangible impact on patients, health-care
providers, and scientific policy.
Notes
1. From Heinlein’s Methuselah’s Children (1958).
2. The irony is that Green is one of the few bioethicists to discuss SF at any
length. He is to be commended for providing thoughtful examinations not only of
Brave New World but of works by Nancy Kress and Octavia Butler, as well as
short comments on Greg Bear, a story by Ursula K. Le Guin, more mainstream
works such as Oryx and Crake, Never Let Me Go, and The Time Machine, and
the films Gattaca and The Boys from Brazil. All the same, he thinks that Kress
and Butler, his principal examples of SF, are outliers in the genre when the
reverse is the case: Disaster scenarios are the outliers.
3. The phrase “more than human” also serves as the title of a recent book
advocating biological enhancement, although the author does not think it worth-
while to nod to Theodore Sturgeon. See Ramez Naam’s More Than Human:
Embracing the Promise of Biotechnology (2005).
4. The forgettable 2009 science fiction film Surrogates, starring Bruce Willis,
makes apparent the connection between “science fictionality” and the predictions
in this academic field by intercutting news clips from interviews with noted
bioethicists, including Gregory Stock, one of the authors quoted above.
5. Cary Wolfe, one of the few literary critics who has explored this field, accu-
rately notes that the “institutionally powerful forms of bioethics” are “less an
ethics per se than a branch of policy studies” (xxvii). I treat the two fields,
bioethics and policy studies, in tandem.
6. As was common in the field, most of these works were serialized in pulp
magazines, in many cases years before they appeared reworked as novels (or
“fix-ups,” as the fan phrase had it). Methuselah’s Children, for example, first
appeared as a novel in 1958, even though it had been serialized in John
W. Campbell’s Astounding Science Fiction over three installments in 1941.
7. For an account of social Darwinist themes throughout Heinlein’s canon, see
Philip E. Smith, “The Evolution of Politics and the Politics of Evolution: Social
Darwinism in Heinlein’s Fiction” in Joseph D. Olander and Martin Harry
Greenberg’s Robert A. Heinlein (1978). Heinlein’s advocacy of free enterprise,
his role as an anti-communist Cold Warrior, and his often sexist portrayal of
women have been frequently canvassed (see Franklin, David Seed’s American
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Science Fiction and the Cold War: Literature and Film [1999], and Frank
H. Tucker’s “Major Political and Social Elements in Heinlein’s Fiction,” also in
Olander and Greenberg’s text).
8. See Kevles 164–75 and Alexandra Minna Stern’s Eugenic Nation: Faults
and Frontiers of Better Breeding in America (2005), 16–18.
9. Bruce Clarke provides a good reading of Arthur C. Clarke’s novel as shaped
by a “kind of Anglo-American United Nations wish fulfillment” that portrayed
telepathy as “the social communication needed to heal the divisions of a
Cold-Warring and decolonizing world,” brought down from “the galactic first
world to the underdeveloped backwater of Earth on wings of mystic good will
alone” (38).
10. Another landmark SF novel from 1953, Bester’s The Demolished Man,
winner of the Hugo Award for that year, also revolves around a minority popula-
tion in the future that possesses telepathic powers. Although the novel does not
explore evolutionary themes or the posthuman, eugenics plays a peripheral role.
The Esper Guild’s “Eugenic plan” attempts “to bring Extra Sensory Perception to
everyone in the world” (18). The closest the novel comes to the major themes
explored here is a comic aside: “Those damned mindreaders are supposed to be
the greatest advance since Homo sapiens evolved. E for Evolution. Bastards! E
for Exploitation!” (8–9).
11. Heinlein’s assumption that every cell contained 48 rather than 46 chromo-
somes reflected an ongoing debate among scientists as late as the 1950s, and a
character’s remark that “Genetics remained practically at a standstill for a century
before ultramicroscopy reached the point where genes could really be seen”
(Beyond 142) must have seemed plausible a full decade before Rosalind
Franklin’s X-ray photographs captured the helical structure of DNA.
12. “Surface Tension,” the third chapter of the published novel, was written
before Watson and Crick’s discovery came out, but the only trace of genetics in
the 1957 version of the story comes in the “Prologue,” which was a piece of the
connective tissue added in 1957 to “fix-up” the five separately published stories
for release as a novel.
13. The affective appeal of this self-contradictory stance helps explain notorious
elements of SF in the period, such as Heinlein’s celebrations of group love and
shared consciousness (recall grokking in Stranger in a Strange Land [1961] or
the orgies of Time Enough for Love [1973]), side by side with his Cold War
paranoia about communist mind control in The Puppet Masters (1951) or the hive
mind in Starship Troopers (1959). Franklin comments on Heinlein’s inability
“to reconcile this vision of extreme individualism with his belief in social
cooperation” (87).
14. See Schwab’s “Ethnographies of the Future: Personhood, Agency, and
Power in Octavia Butler’s Xenogenesis,” Accelerating Possession: Global Futures
of Property and Personhood, ed. Gabriele Schwab and Bill Maurer (2006). But
also see Molly Wallace’s “Reading Octavia Butler’s Xenogenesis after Seattle” in
Contemporary Literature 50 (2009): 94–128, who argues that the Xenogenesis
trilogy deterritorilizes identity only to reinscribe genetic essentialism within the
bounds of neoliberalism. Her strong reading of the novel testifies to the tenacity
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of genetic essentialism as an ideological construct in spite of Butler’s
posthumanism.
15. Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), cowritten by Arthur
C. Clarke, reflects Clarke’s roots in the science fiction of the1950s. The conceit
of sudden species change brought to humanity by a superior alien intelligence
draws on motifs from Childhood’s End, while its depiction of the embryonic post-
human in the film’s final sequence universalizes evolution’s next step rather than
emphasizes diversity. The movie 2001 ends up portraying the posthuman in very
different terms from the SF that is published in the two decades approaching
2001.
16. Darwin’s Radio conforms to the paradigm of the contagion narrative
described by Priscilla Wald in Contagious (2007). Heather Schell discusses the
“socially conservative ideas about gender, race, imperialism, and human society”
encoded in Bear’s novel (806) in “The Sexist Gene: Science Fiction and the
Germ Theory of History,” American Literary History 14.4 (2002): 805–27. Lisa
Lynch joins Schell in criticizing Bear’s work as a “sociobiological celebration of
human development” and sees “[t]he generic collapse between the outbreak
thriller and the science-fiction novel” as a sign of how a medical story about con-
taining an epidemic can become “a rallying cry for the arrival of the posthuman”
(71, 73) in “‘Not a Virus, but an Upgrade’: The Ethics of Epidemic Evolution in
Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio,” Literature and Medicine 20.1 (2001): 71–93. For
my own reading of Darwin’s Radio, see Charles Dickens in Cyberspace (2003).
17. John Harris has presented the most thorough account of what he sees as
the inadequacies of Kass and Sandel’s arguments concerning human nature
and human dignity. See also Steven Pinker’s “The Stupidity of Dignity” in the
28 May 2008 issue of The New Republic.
18. See Gregory Stock’s Redesigning Humans (2002), Maxwell J. Mehlman’s
Wondergenes (2003), Joel Garreau’s Radical Evolution (2004), Ramez Naam’s
More Than Human (2005), John Harris’s Enhancing Evolution (2007), and
Ronald M. Green’s Babies by Design (2007).
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